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Book Reviews
How ARBITRATION WORKS (3rd Edition). By Frank El-
kourit and Edna Asper Elkouritt. Washington: Bureau of
National Affairs, 1973. Pp. 797. $17.50.
Outside of the services containing published arbitration decisions,
the Elkouris' book, How Arbitration Works, long has been the reference
source most frequently cited by practitioners in labor arbitration and
on occasions by arbitrators themselves. The second edition was pub-
lished in 1960, so that in recent years it had become outdated. Many
new issues, not present in the 1950's, have been going to arbitration.
For other issues, like subcontracting, the principles governing such
cases have become more firmly established, while with still others, as
the arbitrator's right to direct a trial period in promotion cases, the
position of many arbitrators has changed.
Thus, practitioners and many arbitrators will be welcoming this
1973 edition of How Arbitration Works. The work reflects the enor-
mous increase in both the volume of labor arbitration cases and the
increasing variety of issues arising therein. Besides treating topics like
the legal status of arbitration, procedures and techniques, its scope,
and the variety of arbitration tribunals, the authors have referenced
hundreds of arbitration decisions, from which they have set forth
the general consensus of principles and qualifications thereto for most
of the issues that have been treated in arbitration.
The book has been expanded from 486 pages to 797, and the revi-
sion represents almost a complete rewriting. With the exception of
chapters like "Arbitration and Its Setting," "Scope of Labor Arbitra-
tion," and "Standards for Interpreting Contract Language," where the
subject matter has not changed greatly since 1960, the other chapters
have been completely rewritten to reflect the many changes in issues
and problems connected with the use of labor arbitration since 1960.
Two new chapters have been added. One, titled "Safety and Health,"
chapter sixteen, reflects the increasing occurrence of safety and health
as a factor in the arbitration of grievances. Of particular value in this
t Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma.
tt J.D., George Washington University School of Law, 1951.
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chapter is the analysis of cases dealing with refusal to obey orders,
where such refusal is based on an alleged safety hazard.
The other new chapter, titled "Employee Rights and Benefits," chap-
ter seventeen, sets forth the analysis of arbitration decisions for many
issues, which in the 1940's and 50's rarely arose or were non-existent,
but which in the changing 60's appeared with increasing frequency.
Among these are such issues as leaves of absence for maternity, jury
duty and funerals, moonlighting and outside business activities; per-
sonal appearance cases involving hair, beards and clothing, surveillance
of employees, and possession and use of dangerous weapons, to cite a
few.
Other chapters, although following the same basic outline as was
presented in the 1960 edition, have been expanded to treat the many
developments in both law and arbitration that took place since that
volume. Chapter five, which treats grievances and grievance proce-
dures, discusses such current topics as abuse and misuse of grievance
procedures, remedies for distressed grievance procedures, and the rights
of individual employees to fair representation in the processing of
grievances as affected by the Supreme Court in Republic Steel Corp. v.
Maddox.' Also, chapter six, "Determining Arbitrability," reflects the
substantial changes in the relationship of arbitration to the courts, as
was wrought by the Supreme Court's determination of substantive law
for arbitration set forth in the now famous Trilogy and subsequent
decisions.2
This new edition discusses some of the old arbitration controversies
that have continued, and it analyzes several of the newer ones that have
arisen. In chapter four, the authors touch on the age-old question,
"Who makes better arbitrators, those with or without legal training?"
As would be expected the lawyer-authors resolve the question in favor
of the legal training by stating: "Legal training alone is not enough to
make an able arbitrator, but if a person possesses the other qualifi-
cations, legal training will make him even better."3 From the-point of
view of a non-lawyer, this conclusion could be stated somewhat differ-
ently as, "a thorough knowledge of collective bargaining and industrial
1. 379 US. 650 (1965).
2. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp. 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 524 (1960).
3. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOUiu, How ARBrrATiON WORKS 95 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
ELKOURi & ELKouRi].
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relations alone may not be enough, but if a person has acquired some
knowledge of law, that along with his basic background in collective
bargaining will make him even better."
The chapter eight treatment of the use of evidence in arbitration
discusses the conflict between strict and liberal admission of evidence.
This controversy has not changed much since the 1950's. There are
still many practitioners who feel that arbitrators are too free and easy
in admitting evidence, while at the other end of the spectrum there
are those who claim that arbitrators have become too legalistic with
respect to what should be accepted as evidence.
As long as arbitration remains a creation of the parties to collective
bargaining this controversy is likely to continue. Most arbitrators will
tend to try to please both sides in the admission of evidence, so that
a more liberal approach tends to be followed. They will hold the
viewpoint that in the final analysis they will be capable of weighing
properly the evidential value of everything accepted into the record,
and that they are competent enough not to make any important find-
ings based upon inadequate or tainted evidence.
One of the newer points of controversy is whether arbitrators should
use the full scope of their remedy power as defined in United Steel-
workers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.4 in order to achieve equity
or should they follow strictly contractural restraints?5 As is pointed out
in chapter seven, most arbitrators accept the premise that they have
the power to provide a remedy where a contractual violation has taken
place, even though the contact is silent with respect to the remedy.6
However, most are relatively cautious with respect to the devising of
new remedies. An example is the payment of interest on back pay
awards,7 which has had little support among most arbitrators.
Also in this same chapter is a discussion of another topic that has
developed out of the increasing caseload in arbitration. It is a discus-
sion of the problems created when the parties go to' arbitration before
they have completed their grievance negotiations, schedule a date for
the hearing with a selected arbitrator, and then later cancel the case
with relatively short notice to the arbitrator.8
This is a serious problem for a busy arbitrator, for he is placed in the
4. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
5. ELou i & ELKOUu, supra note 3, at 241-46.
6. Id. at 351.
7. Id. at 357.
8. Id. at 208-10.
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position of having to predict his rate of cancellations. If he underpre-
dicts the number he finds himself with an inadequate caseload, even
though he had previously turned away other requests for his services.
If he overpredicts the number, he finds himself overcommitted with
resulting delays in getting out his decisions.
Still another new topic of controversy among arbitrators is the ex-
tent to which arbitrators should consider statutory or administrative
law when resolving disputes over contract language which may be in
violation of the law.9 This is clearly a controversy of the 1960's, which
has resulted from the various forms of equal rights legislation adopted
at the federal and state levels. It also grew out of the increasing num-
ber of grievances filed that represent overlapping jurisdiction between
the National Labor Relations Board and arbitration.
Throughout this book the various topics are presented clearly and
the positions and principles are generally set forth with clarity and
specificity. There are, however, a few exceptions. One is found in
chapter nine. In this chapter, which deals with standards for inter-
preting contract language, the analysis in some sections becomes ex-
tremely technical, and it will leave the average non-lawyer layman
with some confusion. A case in point is where the authors refer to use
by courts and arbitrators of "accepted standards of interpretation of
general application" when interpreting collective agreements. 10 How-
ever, nowhere are these "standards of interpretation" specifically set
forth or explained.
Another is the authors' discussion of the residualrights doctrine in
chapter thirteen, "Management Rights." The chapter begins with a
number of strong statements supporting the residual rights doctrine,
and the analysis leaves the reader with the impression that other than
with some minor exceptions, arbitrators universally endorse the resid-
ual rights doctrine of management authority. In earlier years of arbi-
tration this doctrine was accepted with little or no reservations, and
even currently some arbitrators continue to uphold it. However, the ac-
ceptance of the concept of enforceable past practices and the idea that
management has certain implied obligations in a collective bargaining
agreement has gained wide acceptance. The latter concept of implied
obligations has been commonly applied in subcontracting and certain
9. Id. at 325-28.
10. Id. at 298.
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safety cases, while the former has been frequently applied to -various
situations where contract language is silent.
With reference to past practice the discussion of the use of custom
and past practice set forth in chapter twelve is itself relatively weak.
Again this reader was left with the impression that the application of
past practice to situations not treated by contract language is a no-man's
land with substantial disagreement among arbitrators as to whether
such practices become enforceable. While some disagreement does
exist it is mainly in certain fringe-type issues, as for example whether
a certain benefit constitutes a gratuity or an enforceable condition of
employment. Arbitrators tend generally to agree on the conditions or
tests to apply in order to determine what constitutes a validly en-
forceable past practice, and generally they seek to be careful in their
application of those conditions to given situations.
Despite these qualifications there is no question that the Elkouris
havecome up with an outstanding publication. Advocates and arbi-
trators will find it to be of inestimable value in establishing the gen-
erally held principles relating to issues arising in arbitration. In terms
of the savings in research time alone the returns will be substantially
more than the price of the book.
Thomas J. McDermott*
DEVIANCE-IN SOVIET SOCIETY-CRIME, DELINQUENCY AND
ALCOHOLISM. By Walter D. Connor.t New York: Colum-
bia University Press. 1972. Pp. 327. $12.50.
Sober, well-researched books on aspects of the legal and social systems
of other countries always make profitable reading. This seems espe-
cially true of books about the Soviet Union' which functions for many
of us as a negative example. Soviet studies seem to yield information
about how not to go about organizing a society, how not to think about
social problems, much as do studies of the Nazi state. Professor Connor
however,, as is the present fashion, does not adopt an adversary stance.
* BA., Boston University, 1939; M.B.A., Boston University, 1941; Ph.D., Boston Uni-
versity, 1955. Professor of Economics, Duquesne University. Labor Arbitrator.
t Assistant Professor of Sociology, University of Michigan.
1. See, e.g., H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R. (1963).
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Nor does he attempt to view the system of social control of alcoholism,
delinquency and crime in the U.S.S.R. from an internal point of view,
e.g., by adopting the standpoint of the embattled functionary attempt-
ing to impose order on a recalcitrant populace. Instead, he dons the
mask of the detached observer, specifically that of the trained academic
sociologist. This strategy meets the requirements of the content of the
book which is devoted in the main to a thorough marshaling of the
information available about crime and corrections in the U.S.S.R.
Connor's refusal to make value judgments about the state of the Soviet
reality which he attempts to describe is made easier by his exclusion
of "political" deviance from the book.2 Although this strategy fits
neatly into the pure science paradigm on the appropriate role of the
scholara it evades what seems to some observers an age-old question-
the relationship between scholars and rulers.4 The debate has taken on
a particular edge and poignancy in our era as the result of the emer-
gence of two ideologies born of contempt for man and his God-given
dignity-Nazism and the Leninist 5 brand of Marxism. Those of us who
are lawyers and as such constantly engaged in the appraisal of our own
and other social systems for their conformity with'the dictates of. our
legal and Constitutional tradition (much of which is embodied in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a document constantly in-
voked by current Soviet dissidents) may be forgiven by the aspirants
to value-free monographic work for what must seem an obsession.8
Sociologists concerned with crime and delinquency have been cyni-
cally defined as persons who keep their eyes down and their palms up.
2. W. CONNOR, DEVIANCE IN SOVIET SocIErY 1-2 (1972) [hereafter cited as DEVIANCE]. But
see Connor, The Manufacture of Deviance: The Case of the Soviet Purge, 1936-1938, 37
Am. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 403 (1972), for a valuable discussion of the Stalinist purges of po-
litical deviants.
3. See Black, The Boundaries of Legal Sociology, 81 YAIM L.J. 1086 (1972).
4. See generally L. STRAuss, ON TYRANNY (rev. ed. 1963).
5. The thesis that Soviet practice.is rooted in Leninism and not an innovation by Stalin
is advanced by the Nobel Prize winning author Alexander Solzhenitsyn in his recently
published work on the Soviet penal system. N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1972, at 1, cols. 1-3. See
generally A. SOLZHENrrSYN, THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO 1918-1956 (forthcoming, 1974).
6. There are, of course, legal scholars who share Professor Connor's orientation-that
it is enough to describe the processor or instrumentalities of legal and social control with-
out undertaking a clarification of the ends which are served by these processes. This ap-
proach in law has been associated with the names of Professors Hart and Sacks of the
Harvard Law School. For an interesting critique of the legal process school, see P. ACKER-
MAN, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND: A PERSPECTIVE ON TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA (forth-
coming, 1974).
In all fairness, it must be remarked that Professor Connor's standpoint (and that of
Professor Black) is adopted by him strictly in his capacity as a scholar whereas the Legal
Process School recommends the adoption of.neutrality as a recommendation to both scholars
and decision-makers.
1.03.1
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The tendency of social researchers to focus on the failures of individ-
uals at the bottom of the social scale without scrutinizing the actions
of agents of social structure or the causative impact of the social struc-
ture on crime has been severely questioned by Western sociologists.
The interactionist school, for example, has identified rules of law as
"causes of crime."7 This reasoning is persuasive when applied to crimes
without victims such as gambling and other forms of consensual crime
but proves too much when stretched to fit violent crime.8 The fact
that such theories emerge and have a widespread impact both on theory
and practice in this country makes a startling contract with Soviet
theoretical development, as Professor Connor points out. Theorizing
about the causes of crime has been a personally dangerous activity in
the Soviet Union,9 indeed academic research was terminated in 1935
and was only relegitimated under the Khrushchev thaw in 1963. There
is still a widespread demand to justify all theorizing in terms strictly
grounded in the prevailing variety of Marxist orthodoxy. Much of So-
viet criminological writing seems to be devoted to explaining away the
existence of a phenomenon which ought not to exist in a socialist so-
ciety, or, as lawyers say, confession and avoidance. The theories of
crime resulting from this basic assumption are reminiscent of nothing
so much as this remark concerning philosophical fallacies: "The phil-
osopher first invents a false theory as to the nature of things, and then
deduces that wicked actions are those which show his theory is false."' 0
Professor Connor's discussion of these Soviet viewpoints reveals more
concern with the state of the criminological discipline than the fate of
the deviant in a social structure which produces and channels such
theorists into positions of academic responsibility. It is probable that
7. See generally E. RUBINGTON & M. WEINBERG, DEvANCE: AN INTERACTIONIST PERSPECTIVE
(1968).
8. Peculiarly enough, forms of white collar crime like antitrust violations, securities
fraud, sale of adulterated or misbranded drugs, which are offensive to sociologists who
adopt the underdog's point of view in interactionist theory, are also "caused" by the
more extensive view of social protection taken by the modern welfare state. White
collar crime too, is an example of culture conflict-the profit maximizing entrepreneur
versus the benevolent paternalism of the state.
A fascinating view of the rise of the "humanitarian police state" is presented in o.
HANDLIN & M. HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH 229-44 (rev. ed. 1969).
9. As has theorizing about the nature of law and the state, witness the liquidation of
Y. Pashukanis for lack of orthodoxy during the Stalin purges. R. CONQUEST, THE GREAT
TERROR 276 (1968).
10. B. RUSSELL, SCEPTICAL ESSAYS 91 (1927). A similar fallacy is found among the ideo-
logues of what I call Supreme Courtism in our own society. A typical remark of the Su-
preme Courtists is "that can't happen, it's unconstitutional." TnE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS (N.
Dorsen ed. 1972), provides a fine specimen of an ideology which is both socially useful and
scientifically useless.
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we shall learn more from Solzhenitsyn's methodologically unsound,
impressionistic revelations about the Soviet system in action than from
the statistics, organization charts, and disputations of the learned which
constitute Connor's primary source material. This is not to say that
Connor has not made the best of the admittedly sketchy and formal-
istic data available to him, he has. It is only that the study of the social
control of any form of deviant behavior, as Radzinowicz' great treatise
on English criminal law shows so clearly, cannot be achieved without
detailed investigation of the mundane activities of the agents of social
control.1 This information is not made available to detached in-
quirers in a totalitarian society.1
2
Professor Connor has done a first-rate job of describing a less charged
area in which the Soviet state has mobilized its resources to define and
control a social problem-the problem of drunkenness. The drunk is
not defined as a medical problem (the disease of alcoholism) or as a
problem in the maintenance of public order.1 8 He is a voluntary sinner
against the ideal of productive, other-regarding Socialist Man, and he
must be ferretted out, redeemed and reintegrated into society and the
world of socially productive work. To achieve this task a panoply of
means are employed by the Soviet state, including: propaganda in
school, enlistment of members of the Communist youth movement in
apprehending or reporting on drunks, public shaming of the drunk by
neighbors and co-workers, reprimands and suspension of privileges by
comrade's courts, compulsory "treatment" in a treatment correctional
center, and finally, conviction of social parasitism with confinement in
a penal correctional institution.14 It will be noted that the stress is on
preventive and informal sanctioning mechanisms lodged in the family,
residential area or place of work, but guided by the omnipresent Party
II. Radzinowicz' work is, unlike that of his predecessor Stephen, primarily a study of
criminal law administration rather than of doctrine. See generally L. RAnziNowicz, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMIN.L LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION (1948-1956).
12. Study of the Nazi archives which fell into Allied hands made possible the masterful
and gruesome chronicle of Hitler's process of destruction. Cf. R. HILBERG, THE DxrirUcToN
OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS (1961).
13. This is the basic rationale offered in Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), for the
constitutionality of imprisoning chronic alcoholics for public drunkenness. Strangely
enough, twenty years of-study by the Yale and Rutgers Centers on Alcoholism have pro-
vided massive evidence of the physiological and criminogenic effects of drinking undreamed
of by the most fervent Prohibitionist during the era of the Noble Experiment. The nexus
between drunkenness and crimes of violence is so great that one might be tempted to
justify drunkenness arrests as a preventive measure even in certain private contexts into
which police are constantly being thrust, e.g., the family quarrel.
14. DEvINcE, supra note 2, at 59-79.
1033
Duquesne Law Review
apparatus. As in Puritan Massachusetts, 15 official and quasi-official in-
trusi6 n completely permeates the fabric of day-to-day life in the Soviet
Union-all other groupings are harnessed to the achievement of the
common ends of the State and Party, at least in theory.
A patchwork net of voluntary and informal social control linked ul-
timately to Party discipline and the formal agencies of procuracy and
court is also found in the area of juvenile delinquency.' 6 A bureau-
cracy of specialists in social work among juveniles with job descriptions
and certification procedures has not emerged in the Soviet Union.
Considering the stereotyped picture of totalitarian society as replete
with bureaucrats having cradle to grave jurisdiction, this lack is both
surprising and puzzling. Surely the Soviets have not anticipated that
the institutionalization of a specialized juvenile authority will blossom,
as it has among certain avant-garde social workers in this country, into
the development of paid adversaries of the social structure they are
charged with maintaining. One explanation might be that the Soviets
refuse to treat the phenomenon of juvenile delinquency as a complex
one involving the clash of conflicting cultures, aspirations and life
styles. 17 They may believe that there is a common interest between
juvenile offenders and the rest of us to which ordinary adults armed
with little more than common sense can appeal in order to induce
conforming behavior. Given the miserable record of failure and non-
feasance by America's professional altruists in this area, as in so many
others, such an approach is not absurd on its face. It seems highly un-
likely however, that social integration of juvenile offenders can be
achieved by methods involving an endless parade of ideological ab-
stractions whether derived from the official culture in the Soviet Union,
or the counter culture or revolutionary nationalism that animates so
many in our country.
Connor's chapter on crime prevention and criminal correction deals
with topics that may be of some interest to a wide audience of lawyers
and correctional officials.' 8 There are, as in most European countries,' 9
15. See G. HASKiNS, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETrS 76 (1960). The analogy
between Puritan and Soviet ideology and practice is an underlying theme in many studies.
Cf. P. Mn.LER, THE NEW ENGLAND MIND (1939). The Puritans did not, however, share the
Marxist belief in the innate perfectability of man.
16. DEVIANCE, supra note 2, at 114-46. There are also no professional parole or probation
officers for either adult or juvenile offenders.
17. There is some indication that juvenile delinquency may be more widespread in the
non-Russian areas of the Soviet Union.
18. DEVIANCE, supra note 2, at 190-235.
19. For a concise description of the most highly developed system of measures of security
1034
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a wide range of preventive sanctions at the disposal of police and pro-
curatorial authorities, short of arrest and imprisonment. Many of these
measures are the functional equivalent of our civil remedy of injunc-
tion-to order the guilty person to perform certain positive duties, e.g.,
undergo medical treatment, or to avoid certain locations or associa-
tions. We are more familiar with this kind of flexibility in sanctions for
traffic violations wherein an offender may be ordered to refrain from
driving for a certain fixed period (suspension of license) or may be
ordered to attend traffic safety classes for a given period (conditional
revocation of license). Other measures involve referring criminal com-
plaints to more informal agencies of social control such as neighbor-
hood meetings (KOLLEKTIV).20 The measures for averting crime
which authorize widespread investigative work by police to facilitate
halting crimes in the preparatory phase do not differ in kind from the
increasing prominence given in American police work to electronic
surveillance, the use of undercover agents and informers, and the con-
siderable expansion of the arrest powers under the law of attempted
crime,2 1 although they most certainly differ in degree. There is no
question that we are pursuing under other labels many of the practices
which have long been associated on the continent with theories stress-
ing the protection of society by nipping potential offenders in the
bud.22
The bulk of this chapter is devoted to a detailed description of the
formal organization of Soviet correctional institutions. There is little
on the continent (the Italian misure di sicurezza), see H. Su.vING, I CRIMINAL JUSTIcE 32-48
(1971).
20. A proposal along these lines for referral of certain victimless crimes to neighborhood
adjudicating bodies was made in New York City and is described in Danzig, Toward Com-
pletion of a Complementary, Decentralized System of Criminal justice, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1
(1973).
21. The Pennsylvania Penal Code, based on the American Law Institute's Model Penal
Code, adopts the "social dangerousness" rationale as a justification for this definition of
criminal attempt: "A person commits an attempt when, with intent to commit a specific
crime, he does any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that
crime." CONSOL. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 901(a) (1973). What constitutes a substantial step
is left undefined in the Pennsylvania Penal Code. The Model Penal Code enumerates cer-
tain fact situations which justify the submission of an attempt count to the jury where
there is no evidence that the accused engaged in "lying in wait, searching for or following
the contemplated victim of the crime." MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(2)(a) (Prop. Offic. Draft
1962). This might justify a result like McQuirter v. State, 36 Ala. App. 707, 63 So. 2d 388
(1953). Compare Lewis v. State, 35 Ala. 380 (1860), discussed in 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON
LAw 56 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
22. See generally Ancel, Social Defense, 72 L.Q. REv. 491 (1962). There is a strong em-
pirical basis now for the proposition that recidivist offenders for relatively severe crimes
can be identified at an early stage in their criminal careers. M. WOLFGANG, T. SELLIN & F.
FIGLIO, DEuNQUENCY IN A BrTn COHORT (1972). It is but a short step from identification to
the adoption of preventive measures.
1035
Duquesne Law Review
here to shock or surprise-Connor's material was gathered from official
sources exclusively. 28 Thus Connor does not deviate from his decision
to exclude "political" deviance from his focus of attention by making
reference to the rather extensive literature on the treatment of politir
cals in Soviet correctional institutions.24 It would seem to this reviewer
that this type of evidence should have been sifted for what it was worth
in shedding light on "normal" Soviet penal practice. But one supposes
that reliance on literary works like One Day in the Life of Ivan Deniso-
vich or accounts smuggled out of Russia concerning the treatment of
Amalrik and other Soviet dissenters, or on testimony by defectors like
Kravchenko would not have satisfied canons of contemporary scholar-
ship.
In the final chapter,2 5 Connor provides an outspokenly critical dis-
cussion of Soviet theories about deviance which may be summed up as
follows:
1. Omnipresence of ideological blinders in the Soviet literature.
2. Espousal of an epidemiological view of deviance-which is pic-
tured as a virus spread by contact of the contaminated with the clean.
3. All crime is viewed as socially determined yet all individuals are
capable of acting other than in conflict with the norms of a socialist
society.
4. Absence of theories that find deviance may be beneficial as well
as costly to society.
5. Adoption of congruence with Soviet ideology and practical utility
for appraising theories.
6. Perniciousness of linkage between criminology and law.
It is submitted that propositions one through six restate, at varying
levels of abstraction, a basic analytical failure by Soviet criminological
thinkers to adopt an appropriate observational standpoint. As to propo-
sition seven, Connor attributes much causal importance in accounting
for the conservative bias in Soviet thinking to its subordination to laws
23. Connor does gather some useful evidence concerning patterns of disposition of of-
fenders. Of those criminals detected, roughly one-quarter escape formal criminal responsi-
bility, another quarter are sentenced to corrective works (which may involve forced change
in location), and roughly one-half receive deprivation of freedom (of which some sentences
are suspended).
On corrective works, compare DEVIANCE, supra note 2, at 204-06 with ABA STANDARDS
RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDuRES § 2.4 (partial confinement) 15-16,
74-79 (1967).
24. DEVIANCE, supra note 2, at 1-2.
25. Id. at 236-51.
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or legal science. 26 Connor treats this subordination as if it were a part
of some assumed unilineal pattern describing the evolution of criminol-
ogy as a science-the necessity for emancipation from the tutelage of a
normative discipline such as law so that an autonomous value-free sci-
ence may emerge. I fail to see what is either liberating or theoretically
compelled in elevating a peculiarity of academic compartmentalization
in this country into some sort of universal. However, this is part and
parcel of my major criticism of the book, for scientism is every bit as
constricting and biased a perspective from which to account for human
affairs as legalism.2 7 The truth is that criminology can no more be sepa-
rated from the study of power processes than can criminal law. It too
must grapple with the fundamental problems of the appropriate rela-
tionship between the individual and the state.28 It seems to me that
recent efforts by lawyers in constitutional litigation involving every as-
pect of the criminal process from arrest through probation as well as
efforts by the American Bar Association 29 have gone far toward defining
and clarifying these fundamental problems. From the lawyer's point of
view, Connor's book is flawed by its effort to sidestep these issues. Soviet
society is detestable in direct proportion to the unquestioning subordi-
nation of the claims of the individual to the state, its legal science in
proportion to the failure of its legal profession to develop an adversary,
client-centered approach toward human rights questions, its social sci-
ence in proportion to its adherence to the dictates of that society and
that legal science.
Even when all possible scientific questions about the structure and
operation of the deviance processing machinery in the Soviet Union
have been answered, the problems of life there, the riddles that are
both unanswerable and of ultimate concern to a human-centered disci-
pline like law, remain completely untouched. 80
Michael E. Libonati*
26. Id. at 250-51.
27. For a brilliant polemical account of the biases of American legal science, see Horwitz,
Book Review, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 275 (1973).
28. Allen, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. CraM. L.C. & P.S. 226 (1959).
29. See note 23 supra.
30. Cf. L. Wr-rGENsTrIN, TpACrATuS LoGIco-PHILOSOPHICUS 148-49 (D.F. Pears & B.F.
McGuinness transls. 1961).
A.B., Georgetown University, 1964; LL.B., Yale University, 1967; LL.M., Yale Uni-
versity, 1969; Associate Professor of Law, Temple University Law Center.
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LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN: STATUS, PROGRESS AND PRO-
PosALs. A Symposium of the Columbia Human Rights
Law Review. Fairlawn: R. E. Burdick, Inc., 1973.
Pp. 212. $9.00.
Did we win or lose?
We won.
Yeah? What did we win?
A decision that you didn't do itl
But I didn't do it 1
The Columbia Human Rights Law Review has produced a signifi-
cant symposium and valuable resource volume; the collected papers
contain much information with which most general practitioners are
probably unfamiliar but which should be-reviewed if they are at all
concerned with juvenile courts.
Although of great value to the bar or jurists newly involved in family
or youth law, this volume will still require those with much background
in youth law to refer elsewhere for debate on other pragmatic, current
and pointed issues, e.g., the "right to treatment" for wards of juvenile
courts, 2 the oppressive, continuing problems with voluntary transfers of
temporarily dependent minors to social welfare agencies," the special-
ized "exclusionary rules" recently developed for interrogation of chil-
dren,4 and difficult legal issues concerning "runaways" could have
1. Conversation between a child and the attorney-author of chapter 5 in LEGAL RIGHTS
OF CHILDREN: STATUS, PROGRESS AND PROPOSALS (1973) [hereinafter cited as SyMPosIuM].
2. See, e.g., Symposium-Observations on the Right to Treatment, 10 DuQ. L REV.
553 (1972); see also (preferably in the following order of study) Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d
451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1967); In re Elmore, 382 F.2d
125 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971); Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); In re Harris, 2 Crim. L Rptr. 2412 (Cook County, Cir. Ct.,
Ill. 1967); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Nelson v. Heyne, 491
F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974). All these cases help to conceptualize and define a growing
constitutional right to rehabilitative treatment, tailored to the needs of the individual child
where liberty is deprived for reasons relating to the doctrine of parens patriae.
3. The poor and uneducated are often not made aware of the meanings of clauses
that qualify the parental right to "demand" return with agencies options to file court
petitions. Also, no provisions exist for rights to consult counsel prior to signing such
forms or to compel explanation of all the ramifications from the point of view of proof
in court, e.g., social investigations occurring during "temporary" family separations will
certainly be devoid of information concerning how well integrated is that family unitl
4. I am here referring to the "line" of decisions commencing with People v. Burton,
6 Cal. 2d 375, 491 P.2d 793, 99 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971), distinguished in Commonwealth v.
Porter, 449 Pa. 153, 295 A.2d 311 (1972), and synthesized and resolved in and by Lewis v.
State, 288 N.E.2d 138 (Ind. 1972) and In re K.W.B., No. KCD26307 (Mo. Ct. App., Oct.
1973). See also Schlam, Police Interrogation and 'Self-Incrimination of Children by Par-
ents: A Problem Not Yet-Solved, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 618 (1973).
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received more treatment.5 And several chapters are of only passing
value to the legal practitioner.6
The child desperately requires means to oppose the oppression of
parens patriae and tools to demand that its theoretical rhetoric be
exercised for his or her personal development. This volume, of course,
only points the way.7
William 0. Flannery's piece is excellent and, ideally, the general
practitioner ought to begin this volume with his chapter. It discusses
the probability of United States Supreme Court inclusion of the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule to juvenile court delinquency proceed-
ings8-after a discussion of the history, concepts and major decisions
affecting the juvenile courts.
State courts, however, have already taken the initiative and incorpo-
rated "exclusionary" rules into juvenile court procedures as a matter
5. Senator Bayh's article is basically little more than a compilation of widely known
statistics and previously presented speeches, e.g., excerpts from the Congressional Record
containing testimony before the Senate on the "runaway" problem. There is some dis-
cussion of proposed legislative solutions but no discussion of legal and political problems
still inherent in this and similar legislation as well as in state law. See McNulty, The Right
to be Left Alone, 11 A.B.A. OdM. L. REV. 141 (1972); Schlam, Runaways, An International
Problem, ADIT: APPROACHES TO DRUc ABUSE AND YouTH 7 (1973).
6. Berns' misplaced and confused compassion in his chapter on children in detention
relates experiences of general applicability to any helping profession but it is poorly rea-
soned concerning the issues of the proper requirements of service and treatment, eg.,
"bound-over" boys, who "stay longer" are not "disruptive of the humane treatment pro-
gram [they] are trying to administer" but should somehow be the objects of some form
of treatment. Symposium, supra note 1, at 20.
7. The general practitioner benefits from a survey of the problems, the youth specialist
will need to be part of the solution. For example, in addition to the other substantive
issues not to concern in SYMPOSIUM, supra note 1, the specialist would benefit from notes
on the unsettled area of juvenile court discovery e.g., do we use civil, criminal or both
standards? Are the standards the same for neglect "prosecution'? See Joe Z. v. Superior
Court, 3 Cal. 2d 797, 478 P.2d 26, 91 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1970) (delinquency); People ex rel.
Hanrahan v. Felt, 48 Ill. 2d 171, 269 N.E.2d 1 (1971); In re Edgar L., 66 Misc. 2d 142,
320 N.Y.S.2d 570 (Fam. Ct. 1971); In re W., 62 Misc. 2d 585, 309 N.Y.S.2d 280 (Fain. Ct.
1970) (neglect, no right to discover); In re Curtis B., 52 Misc 2d 420, 275 N.Y.S.2d 997
(Sup. Ct. 1966) (neglect, civil rules). And what of truancy, thought not the province of
juvenile courts by myself, among others, as well as the currently convoluted procedures used
in many states regarding non-educatable or disciplinary problem students, who are deprived
of liberty as "minors otherwise in need of supervision." See D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1551(l)(b)
(1973); IiL. REv. STAT. ch. 37 § 702-3 (1972). Also, the nationwide controversy over transfer
or waiver of allegedly "untreatable" children from a juvenile division to a criminal divi-
sion cries out for extensive examination by the legal community. See Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); Missouri ex rel. T.J.H. v. Bills, S.W.2d (Mo. Sup. Ct., Jan-
uary 14, 1974) (clear and definite standards, juvenile judge's factual opinion required,
burden on state to show no rehabilitation possible); and the recently amended Illinois
statute, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37 § 702-7 (1972), as compared to In re Templeton, 302 Kan. 89,
447 P.2d 158 (1968) (no proof of delinquency allegation necessary); People v. Fields, 30
Mich. App. 390, 186 N.W.2d 15 (1971) (no criteia need be provided judge by juvenile
waiver statute); Lavis v. State, 86 Nev. 889, 478 P.2d 168 (1970) (no reasons need be given
by judge).
8. SYMpOsIuM, supra note 1, at 129.
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of due process and equal protection of the law,9 leaving us with the
question (unanswered in the essay): what difference does this advocacy
and scholarship make (or harm might it do) to our practice? Recent
Supreme Court pronouncements in this area are unsatisfactory; more
harm than good may result were Flannery afforded the opportunity to
argue his thesis before the Court as rejection now seems probable. 10
Even assuming that a Supreme Court decision on juvenile court ex-
clusionary rules is advisable or necessary, Flannery's use, by analogy,
of both Elkins v. United States" (both federal and state prosecutors
must, supposedly, be similarly prohibited, under the fourth amendment
from the use of either's illegally seized evidence) and the extension of
fourth amendment exclusionary rules to state courts by Mapp v. Ohio, 2
is an inadequate basis for hope. In United States v. Ramsey, 8 a Missouri
federal district court allowed the introduction of statements at trial that
would have been inadmissible under state exclusionary rules. The
federal judiciary, thus, seems unprepared to accept or expand exclu-
sionary rules to the same extent as have the states-to benefit children
or otherwise.
The use of Camera v. Municipal Court14 and See v. Seattle,"5 as
argument for extending exclusion to juveniles was valuable to the
extent that federal courts accept federal precedent, e.g., In re Gaultle
9. See note 4 supra; motions to suppress may presently be made in most juvenile courts.
In re L.B., 99 N.J. Super. 589, 240 A.2d 709 (Juv. & Dor. Rel. Ct. 1968). Even where civil
rules are still proper in delinquency cases, authority for suppression motions exists. Rea-
soner v. State, 463 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App., 1971). See aNo In re Marsh, 40 Ill. 2d 53,
237 N.E.2d 529 (1968); In re Williams, 49 Misc. 2d 154, 267 N.Y.S.2d 91 (Fain. Ct. 1966).
10. State high courts continue to uniformly reject attacks on exclusionary rules at
trial, e.g., Gibbs v. State, 14 Crim. L. Rptr. 2450 (Ark. 1974); and even extend such rules
to additional procedural areas, e.g., State v. Wilson, 14 Crim. L. Rptr. 2452 (Hawaii 1974)
(preliminary hearing) even though they will not extend the rule to all areas of procedure,
e.g., State v. Simms, 14 Grim. L. Rptr. 2324 (Wash. 1974) (not available at probation or
parole hearings), and Everhart v. State, 14 Crim. L. Rptr. 2481 (Md. 1974) (probable cause
for search warrants). The United States Supreme Court, however, has severely limited
such rules, Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), and is strongly disinclined to extend
it further (certainly a problem for Flannery). See United States v. Calandra, 94 S. Ct. 613
(1974) 14 Crim. L. 3061 (January 8, 1974). In Calandra, Justice Brennan expresses the
fear, justifiably, that the Court is moving toward abandoning the rule (Id. at 624). Cer-
tainly Chief Justice Berger and Justice Blackmun are on record in support of abandon-
ment. See Collidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (dissent). The majority of the Justices are in accord. See
Gustafson v. Florida, 94 S. Ct. 488 (1973); United States v. Robinson, 94 S. Ct. 467 (1973).
11. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
12. 367 U.S. 643 (1961), discussed as an analogy at SYMPosium, supra note 1, at 135.
13. 367 F. Supp. 1307 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
14. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
15. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
16. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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and Miranda v. Arizona,17 not state law.18 But I did not follow Flan-
nery's argument here. Additional procedural rights for delinquency
hearings are improperly demanded by use of an implicit characteriza-
tion (for purposes of his "argument") of delinquency proceedings as
"civil." Evidence obtained from warrantless or unjustified administra-
tive searches must be excluded from criminal prosecutions. But how
does it follow that questionable evidence obtained from a child must,
therefore, be subject to exclusion in the juvenile courts? Can the inter-
rogation somehow be characterized as administrative or "civil"? The
nature of the search, not the hearing, was the focus of Camera and See.
Flannery argues that incorporation of "exclusion" is consistent with
the "Rule" of McKeiver v. Pennsylvania.9 Part of that rule is that,
prior to incorporating a new procedural due process right, it must be
shown that "problems" of juvenile process will more than likely be
solved rather than expanded. I found it hard to understand why Flan-
nery argues that exclusion meets the criteria of McKeiver without
bothering to question obvious inconsistencies; how did the "proof
beyond a reasonable doubt" or the In re Winship standard20 solve any
"problems" of the juvenile process? And he suggests the compromise
that "excluded" evidence be introduced for sentencing, treatment or
disposition? Since Gault and Winship did not discuss disposition, should
the rights to counsel and cross-examination be held not' to apply to
disposition? Flannery does not adequately demonstrate that the exclu-
sionary rule meets whatever "due process" standard for children now
exists or will exist in the future.21
"The Case for Repeal of Section 383 of the New York Social Service
Law,"122 by Oscar Chase and Jonathan Weiss (an early advocate of
juvenile rights responsible for many of the early successes---especially
concerning the right to treatment) as well as the book review by James
Woller of "When Parents Fail: The Law's Response to Family Break-
down" by Sanford N. Katz,23 together, explain the discriminatory
aspects of neglect proceedings and the problems inherent in this aspect
of juvenile court jurisdiction. Woller's review should be read first; it
gives a concise review of the "system" of neglect process after which
17. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
18. 367 F. Supp. 1307 (W.D. Mo. 19783).
19. 402 U.S. 528 (1971).
20. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
21. SYMPosIum, supra note 1, at 153.
22. Id. at 7.
23. Id. at 209.
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one can more easily see the significance of the litigation described by
Weiss and Chase.
Vague neglect statutes provide a judge with "a vehicle for imposing
on others his [sic] own preferences for certain child-rearing practices
and his own ideas of adult behavior and parental morality. 24 The law
provides little guidance for resolution of the basic conflicts in this field:
protecting the integrity of an individual family unit, furnishing a con-
ducive environment for the proper physical and emotional well-being
of the child, and meeting the legitimately expressed needs and desires
of each child. Guaranteed full participation by the child's counsel is
rare.25 In most states, decisions on criteria for finding neglect, i.e., non-
compliance with proper child-rearing norms which should legitimately
allow state intervention, are also rare.20 "Relevant" reading materials
on child development theories27 should not be used to circumvent real
issues and the genuinely relevant needs, desires, and evidence adduced
by the child and his or her counsel.
Weiss and Chase, on the New York law concerning temporary sur-
render of children to the state by persons who are temporarily unable
to render proper care, point out that parents sign surrender "agree-
ments" under duress and unaware of the nature of the document.
Parents unknowingly relinquish the ability to determine their chil-
dren's future. A constitutional problem arises concerning the manner
in which the right to demand immediate return of custody is lost. The
deprivation of such a vital interest as control over one's own child can
not be accomplished, consistent with due process, unless preceded by
a full evidentiary hearing. The signing of voluntary agreements is often
unaccompanied by the aid of counsel, the extent of custodial rights
24. Id. at 210.
25. See, e.g., I.L. REv. STAT. ch. 37 § 702-4 (1972).
Those who are neglected include any minor under 18 years of age
(a) who is neglected as to proper or necessary support, education as required by law, or
as to medical or other remedial care recognized under State law or other care necessary
for his wellbeing, or who is abandoned by his parents, guardian or custodian; or
(b) whose environment is injurious to his welfare or whose behavior is injurious to
his own welfare or that of others.
Id. (emphasis added).
26. Recently, in Illinois, the simple rendering of an appellate decision on standards of
neglect even though that decision did little more than reassert the assumed fact that the
accoutrements of poverty such as filth and disarray were inadequate reasons for removal
from the home for neglect was widely noted and hailed. In re Stacey, 305 N.E.2d 634
(Ill. App. 1973). Prior to Stacey, only two decisions provided guidance and then only as
a source of factual comparisons. E.g., People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Il1. 618, 104
N.E.2d 769 (1952); In the Interest of Garmon, 4 111. App. 3d 391, 280 N.E.2d 19 (1972).
27. See, e.g., J. BowLY, SEPARATION (1974); J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT,
BEYOND THE Brsr INTERESTS OF TE CHILD (1973).
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surrendered are not understood and, when parents later demand re-
turn, they may be flatly refused on the ground that the agency now has
accumulated evidence of unfitness and the parent must "sue" for his or
her children (the former situation in New York) or, suddenly find him-
self or herself the respondent in a court proceeding. At this point of
demand for return, maintain these authors, the agency is revealed to
have unilaterally cut off the right of parental control on the basis of its
own judgment, having afforded the parent no prior opportunity to
be heard.
Boone v. Wyman,2 8 discussed in this chapter, expressed displeasure
with the heavy burden of "going forward" placed on parents in matters
such as these. The court in Boone placed that burden on the state,
holding, as a matter of due process of law, that the fact that deprivation
was conceivably only temporary did not obviate due process require-
ments of notice and filing of proceedings by the state where a child is
being held. Indeed, in most cases, judicial proceedings for recovery are
never initiated by parents. Parents should not be obliged to affirma-
tively prove their fitness in order to have a chance of regaining custody.
But what of the deleterious consequences of even temporary separa-
tion? The parent still has insufficient opportunity, prior to even a
required hearing, to demonstrate fitness, for social report purposes, as
the parent has lost the company of the child and already stands at a
disadvantage. Parental custody prior to the hearing might provide the
parent with valuable evidence in rebuttal to agency allegations. Thus,
since the legitimate interest of the state in safeguarding children would
not be defeated by allowing the natural parent to regain custody on
demand as the state would retain an effective alternative, a closely
proscribed "probable cause" emergency removal process (warrant),
return on demand should not be defeated by simple notice of the filing
of a petition but only the emergency circumstance of imminent harm
sworn to be a reliable informant.
Accordingly, "notice" that court proceedings can be instituted, even
after demand for return, can and is still being used to circumvent due
process of law for natural parents. We need to re-examine the current
practices by which acceptance of a child for care by a state agency is
accomplished without legal counsel and with less than total compre-
hension of the legal ramifications.
28. 295 F. Supp. 1143 (S.D.N.Y.), aif'd, 412 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1024 (1970).
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In re Ella B.,29 completes this volume's "trilogy" (with Weiss and
Chase and the Katz book review) on the field of child neglect. Ella B.,
focused on the right of indigent parents to counsel in child neglect
proceedings. Because civil commitment, or criminal proceedings di-
rected at parents, could result from these proceedings-in addition to
the serious threat of loss of the child's society-parents in neglect pro-
ceedings are entitled to counsel, and to notice of that right, as a matter
of equal protection and due process of law. This case developed the
"state adversary test," a presumption that, where the state is an adver-
sary in any court proceeding, (a) some fundamental right will generally
be involved and (b) the citizen will generally be disadvantaged in terms
of resources of all kinds; accordingly, even though nominally a "civil"
proceeding, a court must weigh this presumption before denying any
specific incorporation of a given procedural protection of the "due
process" clause into neglect proceedings.
Wizner, in his excellent contribution," maintains, as he has con-
stantly and persistantly over the years, 3 ' that what is at stake in juvenile
court is a child's basic human right to liberty and to continue in the
custody of persons of the child's choice. This right is always being
clearly and directly challenged by the state's assumed power to control
crime and enforce morality; the state and the child are adversaries in
every sense of the word.
The equitable and historical doctrine of parens patriae, derived im-
properly, say Wizner, from early practices of the English chancery
courts, now amounts to state interference with and assumption of the
parental function of child-rearing and obscures the adversary relation-
ship between court and child-the doctrine's irrelevancy to the present
and danger to liberty.82 The purpose of the interference is to accom-
plish those therapeutic and social goals primarily placed in but unmet
by natural parents. Unfortunately, the state decides the criteria to be
met as well as whether they are in fact being met
In England, historically, misbehaving children were prosecuted, if at
29. 30 N.Y.2d 352, 285 N.E.2d 288, 334 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1972).
30. SYMpOSiUM, supra note 1, at 101.
31. Based on personal conversations, in various places throughout the country occurring
intermittently since 1969 and from works of this author found elsewhere.
32. The common concern of the Supreme Court, in examining the issue of whether
specific procedures are to be incorporated into the juvenile court as a matter of due process
of law, is that the procedure not add to the "adversary" climate of what they assume should
properly be a protective or rehabilitative proceeding. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403
U.S. 528 (1971); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); SYMposiuM, supra note 1, at 104. Wizner
cites Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C.L REv.
205 (1971).
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all, under the criminal laws. Equitable power, invoked as parens
patriae, occurred only in the resolution of disputes between private
parties over guardianship and property matters affecting infants and
idiots deemed incapable of caring for themselves. Wizner quotes from
Morris and Hawkins:
Historical idiosyncracies gave us a doubtful power over children.
With the quasi-legal concept of parens patriae to brace it, this
assumption of power blended well with the earlier humanitarian
traditions in the churches and other charitable organizations re-
garding child care and child-saving. The juvenile court is thus the
product of paternal error and maternal generosity which is a not
unusual genesis of illegitimacy.33
The basis of Wizner's argument is that "... there must be clearer
role separation in the juvenile courts, a sceptical approach to benev-
olent pretentions, and vigorous and scrupulous deference by counsel
to the wishes of his client, the child."
Wizner prophetically maintains that:
Easy analogies of the state to the parent will not and should not
serve to legitimize the state's power over children. If such a ratio-
nale is relied on, it seems reasonable to expect those affected by
that power, frequently the nation's newly militant poor, to con-
front it in open court and demand that the state's performance be
as parental as advertised. Perhaps we will see an increase in the
number of cases using a writ of habeas corpus to free juveniles from
confinements in institutions demonstrably not rehabilitative or
parental.84
Judge Forer contributes an extensive introduction, explanation and
exposition of a model Youth Court Act which is obviously the product
of a long process of integrating practical experience with extensive
theory. "A Children and Youth Court: A Modest Proposal"35 expresses
the conviction that reform of the juvenile justice system through litiga-
tion alone is time-consuming, wasteful and inefficient. Judge Forer
suggests that state legislatures enact a new law; both criminal and civil
divisions would be unified in one court.
The civil division would allow affirmative actions wherein children
33. SYMPOSiUm, supra note 1, at 104-05, quoting N. MoRRss & G. HAwRiNs, THE HONEST
POLrrICIAN's GUIDE TO CRIME CONTROL 157 (1970).
34. SYMPOSiUM, supra note 1, at 107. Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cit. 1974);
Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Wyatt v. Stickney, 525 F. Supp. 781
(M.D. Ala. 1971).
35. SYMPOSIUM, supra note 1, at ch. 4.
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could assert their claims against those who are allegedly infringing
upon their rights. Many problems which federal courts are now dis-
missing as insignificant would now be capable of resolution in a more
understanding and appropriate forum. In addition to the traditional
juvenile or family court matters of adoption, custody, mental health,
and termination of parental rights, this civil division would entertain
broad actions "brought by or on behalf of a child to obtain redress for
abuse, denial of rights or entitlements."
The criminal division would provide as a matter of law all the sub-
stantive due process safeguards of adult criminal courts, the minimum
rights of a fair and equitable juvenile hearing already established, as
well as further essential safeguards. Some significant proposals are: jury
trials for children charged with serious crimes and the right to public
trials unless the child objects for good cause.
The "Act" would also provide a "Bill of Rights," insuring for juve-
niles proper care, treatment and education. Several exclusive personal
rights for children would be added: the right to bodily safety and in-
tegrity and freedom from physical and mental abuse; the right to
medical, psychiatric and dental care; the right to education; the right
to a home which provides food, shelter, clothing, care and recreation.
The right to treatment is explicitly established for children in custody.
Although, on the whole, Judge Forer's outlined legislation is excel-
lent and progressive, one might have hoped for some additional help
in certain areas. For example, where "runaway" as a delinquent act is
alleged, the affirmative defense of justification (by reason of bad home
or school) exists. However, where truancy (habitually refusing to attend
school) is the "delinquency" alleged, this same affirmative defense is
apparently not thought advisable. This inconsistency is conspicuous
and appears unjustifiable. Another conspicuous lack of depth concerns
"contributing to the delinquency of a minor." It would have been
useful to have some more careful and extensive drafting of this form
of statute. Statutes of this kind have caused great difficulty due to their
vagueness and, often, to their unconstitutional application. 6
36. See, e.g., Vachon v. New Hampshire, 94 S. Ct. 664 (1974); Hanby v. State, 479
P.2d 486 (Alaska 1970); State v. Carey, 284 A.2d 88 (Me. 1971); People v. Owens, 13 Mich.
App. 469, 164 N.W.2d 712 (1969) (good intention to help runaway, no defense); State v.
Vachon, 306 A.2d 781 (N.H. 1973); State v. Blount, 113 N.J. Super. 211, 275 A.2d 754 (App.
Div. 1971); Matter of Oman, 254 Ore. 59, 457 P.2d 496 (1969); State v. Bryant, 3 Wash.
App. 15, 472 P.2d 408 (1970) (good intention of helping runaway, no defense). Although
the foregoing decisions speak to overbroad applications, held unacceptable, the statutes,
themselves, have mostly been sustained against vagueness challenges. See Brockmueller v.
State, 86 Ariz. 82, 340 P.2d 992 (1959); State v. Barone, 124 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1960); McDonald
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My only other wish would have been that the provision concerning
transfer to the adult criminal division, provided for certain cases in
most jurisdictions, would have been drafted so as to speak to waiver
standards, double jeopardy problems, proper rules of evidence or dis-
covery upon hearing, appealability of a transfer, and other unsettled
problems concerning waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction 7
The "Bill of Rights" creates guarantees that are bold, justified, and,
in several particulars, contrary to current practice in most states, e.g.,
no statements given by children who are arrested can be admitted
unless made in the presence of counsel or of a representative; while in
detention, rights to communication with parents, friends and counsel
are guaranteed, solitary confinement of any kind is clearly prohibited;
if the court finds the child innocent, records of arrest are expunged
upon release (self-executing expungment is a much needed advance;
this area of law is now causing some controversy) ;38 no investigation or
testing of children shall be made prior to a finding of guilt; no order
upon a finding of guilt shall exceed the maximum period for which an
adult could be incarcerated for the same offense; and the penalty for a
delinquent act, in any event, shall not exceed six months commitment,
probation or order requiring service.
Of noteworthy significance is the created cause of action for emanci-
pation.39 And as to termination of parental rights: it can be immediate
and complete, the voice and preferenci of the child is guaranteed,
priority is given to non-institutional care if separation from the natural
family is warranted, and the child is declared explicitly incapable of
being deprived of any rights of inheritance or other benefits to which
he is legally entitled from his natural parents.
The most innovative ideas and intriguing papers is William P.
Statsky's "The Training of Community Judges: Rehabilitative Adjudi-
cation." Statsky demonstrates the community youth might beneficially
be taught "self-adjudication." A wide variety of valuable techniques
v. Commonwealth, 331 S.W.2d 716 (Ky. 1960); State v. Hodges, 254 Ore. 21, 457 P.2d 491
(1969).
37. ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-7 (1972), is a recent attempt at a "model" set of stan-
dards for judicial discretion where the state maintains that a child is not deserving of the
benefits of the state's juvenile code.
38. See, e.g., SymPosium, supra note 1, at 173. See Spalty, Ferster & Courtless, The Be-
ginning of juvenile Justice, Police Practices and the Juvenile Offender, 22 VAND. L. Rnv.
567, 602-08 (1969).
39. As to the current interest in and need for such a remedy, see Youth: Transition to
Adulthood, REPORT OF THE PANEL ON YOUTH OF THE PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE ADvIsoRy COM-
MITIEE (1973).
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were used to acclimate young people to conflict resolution in the dem-
onstration project described.
"Community forum judges," neighborhood volunteers with no legal
training or judicial experience, learned to run and participate in the
Forum (a community "court"). These citizens successfully adjudicated
matters that would have otherwise found their way to the juvenile
justice system. As an alternative to police "adjustments," overloaded
courts, and poorly trained probation officers, community conflict resolu-
tion appeared quite satisfactory and generates much hope for the
future. Recidivism was reduced and increasing community conscious-
ness of their ability to manage delinquency prevention was accom-
plished.
Edward R. Spalty's essay "Juvenile Police Record Keeping" is a fine
analysis and survey of a complex and major problem.40 Juvenile police
records are given improper treatment and attention and, as a result of
the inconspicuous nature of the record-keeping process, statutory as-
surances of confidentiality are illusory.
The general practitioner, reading Spalty, will quickly glean the prime
"civil liberties" problem in this field: although police records are often
"unofficial," frequently result from unsubstantiated reports, and often
are no more than accusations of guilt with no rebuttal by the accused,
their uncorroborated use generates "negative labelling" problems for
the child and their presumptively adverse use at detention, custody or
disposition hearings violates standards of due process of law that would
not be permissible for adults, e.g., "evidence" of police contacts short
of arrest could not be considered probative or be used to determine
bail or sentencing for adults. Spalty narrows in on this:
An argument can be made that there is an obvious relationship
between [incident or adjustment reports] and arrest and disposi-
tion. If enough reports are filed their cummulative effect could
lead to the juvenile's eventual arrest and, if used by the court or
probation officer or in making out a pre-sentence report, they
could affect the disposition of the case.41
40. The reader would be well-advised if interested in this specialized problem area to
also refer to the articles in his footnotes. See generally Coffee, Privacy v. Parens Patriae:
The Role of Police Records in the Sentening and Surveillance of Juveniles, 57 CORNELL
L REv. 571 (1972). See also In re Smith, 63 Misc. 2d 198, 310 N.Y.S.2d 617 (Fain. Ct. 1970).
41. SYMpOSiUM, supra note 1, at 190. The problem with the article, however, is a weak
analysis of Cuevas v. Leary, 70 Civ. 2017 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), and the value it has for children;
I am not convinced, at this time, that the stipulation obtained was adequate (see Svem-
Posrum, supra note 1, at 190-91). Also, readers interested in litigation such as this should
refer to Conover v. Montemuro, 477 F.2d 1073 (3d Cir. 1973); Doe v. Scott, No. 74CJ231
(N.D. Cal., Feb. 11, 1974).
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In "Appellate Review for Juveniles: A 'Right' to a Transcript" by
Jonathan I. Mark, we find an "equal protection" based "brief" for ac-
cess to verbatim transcription of trial records for appellate review of
delinquency findings analogous to the argument, previously accepted by
the Supreme Court, that poor persons must be afforded appellate re-
view where state statute affords this right to the wealthy. His essay is
scholarly but not convincing.
Neither Mr. Mark, nor In re Brown,42 a case upon which he relies
(Virgin Islands appeals statute was declared unconstitutional because it
unfairly discriminated against juveniles attempting to appeal), effec-
tively deflects the reasonableness of different age classifications for pur-
poses of provision of certain state "services." The "right" of appeal of
children, that might follow from Brown is not here adequately shown
to (I) include within a specific method of providing an appeal record
(verbatim transcription) or (2) to surpass in importance probable legiti-
mate state interests, e.g., enormous juvenile "crime" causing enormous
expense justifying cheaper alternatives for juvenile court where feasi-
ble.
Mark, himself, points out the problems inherent in his argument:
In re Gault refused to disturb the holding in Griffin and refrained
from saying that due process requires a transcript of juvenile hear-
ings. These two cases, then, preclude our asserting that the right
to a transcript is a fundamental due process right, even for adults.4 3
Traditional "equal protection" arguments still do not allow courts to
make the legislative choice of competing legitimate state options.44
On the whole this volume is of great value to the general practitioner
with a growing interest in youth law; it will encourage in him or her
greater study and effort in the field. Those familiar with the field will
receive a useful review of where we have been and insight into the
struggle that remains.
Lawrence Schlam*
42. 439 F.2d 47 (3d Cir. 1971).
43. Sympositum, supra note 1, at 202.
44. Legislative lobbying would seem advisable; Mark does not discuss this.
* B.A., City College of New York, 1964; J.D., New York University, 1967; Adjunct
Professor of Law, DePaul University School of Law, Chicago, Illinois.
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